Division N — CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015
Division Overview
Division N — Cybersecurity Act of 2015 is a policy law attached to an appropriations bill. It does not itself appropriate money.
Overview
This division is the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. It sets rules for how companies, states, and the federal government may share information about cyber threats, and it tightens cybersecurity duties for most federal civilian agencies. It is organized as four titles: information sharing, stronger Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and federal-network authorities, a federal cyber workforce count, and several related studies and industry efforts.
Total Spending
No appropriation amount is stated in this division. The text authorizes activities, sets deadlines, and requires reports. It does not specify dollar amounts for programs, agencies, or grants. Any funding for these activities would have to come from other parts of the bill or from existing agency budgets. A total for Division N cannot be calculated from this text.
Key Funding Areas
There are no line-item appropriations in the text. The main operational commitments, without dollar figures, are:
- DHS real-time sharing portal: Requires DHS, within 90 days, to accept cyber threat indicators and defensive measures from non-federal entities and automatically share them with designated federal agencies.
- Federal intrusion detection and prevention system: Requires DHS, within one year, to deploy and maintain a government-wide capability to detect and block risky network traffic going to or from civilian agency systems.
- Agency adoption of that system: Civilian agencies must route traffic between their systems and outside systems through those capabilities, with later upgrades applied within six months of DHS making them available.
- Intrusion assessment plan: DHS and the Office of Management and Budget must plan routine checks to find and remove intruders on civilian agency systems.
- Federal cybersecurity requirements: Within one year, agencies must identify sensitive and mission-critical data, encrypt it, use a single sign-on identity platform on public websites that require login, and use multi-factor authentication for remote access and privileged accounts.
- Cyber workforce coding: The Office of Personnel Management, with NIST and others, must create codes so agencies can identify and count civilian and military cyber jobs.
- Health-care cybersecurity effort: HHS must convene a one-year task force and develop voluntary, industry-led guidelines. The text does not authorize audits or tie grants or contracts to compliance.
- Studies and reports: Includes work on mobile-device security, U.S. port cyber vulnerabilities, DHS data centers, international cyber policy, and emergency-services networks. No funding levels are specified.
Notable Provisions
- Voluntary sharing, with liability protection: Private entities may monitor their own systems (and others’ systems only with written consent) and share threat indicators and defensive measures. Courts must dismiss lawsuits over monitoring or sharing done under this title. There is no duty to share and no duty to act on what is received.
- Privacy limits: Before sharing, entities and federal agencies must remove personal information not directly related to a cyber threat, or use a technical tool configured to do so. Federal use is limited to cybersecurity, identifying threats and vulnerabilities, responding to specific threats of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm (including terrorism or weapons of mass destruction), serious threats to a minor, and certain crimes such as fraud, identity theft, espionage, and trade-secret theft.
- DHS is the main intake point; Defense and NSA are excluded as the designated portal: The President may later designate another federal entity to run an additional portal, but not the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency.
- Not a backdoor for regulation or mandatory sharing: Shared information generally cannot be used to regulate lawful activity. The government may not require sharing, or condition grants, contracts, or purchases on sharing. Title II also bars DHS from using this subtitle to create new cybersecurity regulations for private entities.
- Secrecy and antitrust treatment: Shared indicators are exempt from federal FOIA and from state and local open-records laws. Companies may share threat information with each other without that exchange itself violating antitrust law. Price-fixing and similar conduct remain illegal. Sharing does not waive trade-secret protection.
- Whistleblower and other protections preserved: The title does not limit lawful disclosures of waste, fraud, abuse, or threats to public health or safety, including disclosures to Congress.
- “Defensive measure” does not include hacking back: A defensive measure may not destroy, disable, or substantially harm a system the operator does not own, unless the owner has consented.
- Sunset dates: Title I’s sharing authorities generally end on September 30, 2025 (actions taken before that date remain covered). Several Title II reporting duties and the intrusion-detection authority end seven years after enactment. Workforce “critical need” reports run through 2022.
- Criminal-law change: Section 407 broadens federal jurisdiction over access-device fraud involving cards or devices issued or controlled by a U.S. financial institution or similar U.S. entity.
- Exclusions: Many new federal-network requirements do not apply to the Department of Defense, national security systems, or the intelligence community.
Who Benefits
- Federal civilian agencies, through required detection tools, encryption, and stronger login controls.
- DHS, which becomes the central hub for voluntary threat sharing and federal network monitoring.
- Private companies, utilities, and nonprofits, which gain clearer legal permission and lawsuit protection for voluntary threat sharing.
- State, tribal, and local governments, including utilities they operate, which may share and receive threat information and are shielded from some open-records disclosure.
- Small businesses, which are specifically mentioned for outreach on cybersecurity best practices.
- Health-care organizations, emergency responders, and port operators, through studies, voluntary guidance, and vulnerability reports rather than new mandates.
- The public, indirectly, if sharing and federal defenses reduce breaches—though the text also limits how personal information in shared data may be kept and used.
Plain English Summary
This part of the bill is not a spending plan. It is a cybersecurity rulebook. It lets companies and governments voluntarily swap tips about hacks and defenses, and it tells courts to throw out lawsuits if that sharing follows the rules. People have to strip out unrelated personal details first, and the government is not supposed to use the tips to regulate businesses or to force anyone to participate. Homeland Security is the front door for tips sent to Washington—not the Pentagon or the NSA. Separately, most civilian federal agencies have to turn on stronger network monitoring, encrypt sensitive data, and use tougher logins. The bill also orders head counts of federal cyber jobs and a set of studies on phones, hospitals, ports, and emergency services. Almost none of this comes with a dollar figure in the text, and the main sharing rules were written to expire in 2025.
Titles
Title Summary
Title I enacts the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. It creates a voluntary legal framework for private companies, state and local governments, and federal agencies to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to run the main real-time intake process for information shared with the federal government. It does not appropriate funds.
Spending Breakdown
This title contains no appropriations or dollar amounts. It authorizes activities, procedures, and liability rules only.
| Line Item | Amount | Purpose |
| No funding line items | — | Policy and authorization only; no money is appropriated |
Notable Sections
- Sec. 104 — Monitoring, defense, and sharing. Private entities may monitor their own systems (and others’ systems only with written consent), operate defensive measures, and share threat indicators. Defensive measures may not destroy or substantially harm systems the entity does not own or lack consent to affect. Sharing among private entities for cybersecurity purposes is exempt from antitrust laws, except price-fixing, market allocation, monopolization, and boycotts (Sec. 108(e)).
- Sec. 105 — Federal receipt and use limits. Within 90 days, DHS must stand up a real-time capability so shared indicators go automatically to designated federal entities (Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence). The President may add another portal but may not designate the Department of Defense, including the NSA. Shared information is exempt from FOIA and state open-records laws, does not waive privilege or trade-secret protection, and generally may not be used to regulate the sharer. Authorized federal uses include cybersecurity; identifying threats or vulnerabilities; responding to a specific threat of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm (including terrorism or a weapon of mass destruction); threats to a minor, including sexual exploitation; and certain fraud, identity-theft, espionage, and trade-secret offenses.
- Sec. 105(b) — Privacy rules. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security must issue privacy and civil-liberties guidelines (interim in 60 days, final in 180 days), including removal or technical scrubbing of personal information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat, retention limits, and sanctions for unauthorized use.
- Sec. 106 — Liability shield. No cause of action lies against a private entity for monitoring or for sharing or receiving indicators in accordance with the title. There is no duty to share and no duty to warn or act on what is received.
- Sec. 108 — Limits and preemption. Sharing is voluntary: the government may not require it, condition other sharing on it, or condition a grant, contract, or purchase on it. The title preempts state or local laws that restrict activities it authorizes, but not state law-enforcement practices. Whistleblower protections are preserved. It does not limit the Secretary of Defense’s authority under 10 U.S.C. § 130g.
- Sec. 111 — Sunset. The title is effective through September 30, 2025, with continued effect for actions taken and information obtained before that date.
- Oversight. Implementation report within 1 year; inspectors general biennial compliance reports; a Comptroller General report within 3 years on removal of personal information; an ODNI report to the intelligence committees within 180 days on foreign cyber threats.
Plain English
Companies and governments may voluntarily share cyber-threat information with each other and with the federal government, with lawsuit protections if they follow the rules, and the government is limited in how it may keep and use that information.
Title Summary
Title II does not appropriate money. It is policy law that expands the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and sets federal-network cybersecurity duties for civilian agencies. Subtitle A is the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015; Subtitle B is the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015. The Department of Defense, national security systems, and the intelligence community are generally excluded.
Spending Breakdown
| Line Item | Amount | Purpose |
| Entire Title II | No dollar amount in the text | Authorizes roles, plans, information-sharing, and reporting; does not appropriate funds |
Notable Sections
- Sec. 203 — Expands NCCIC sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with federal and non-federal entities, fusion centers, and international partners. Sharing is voluntary. The Secretary may refuse or end a sharing relationship at unreviewable discretion, including for national security. Requires capabilities for automated sharing and a public outreach effort within 60 days.
- Sec. 210 — Bars reading this subtitle as new authority for DHS to regulate or set cybersecurity standards for private non-federal entities.
- Sec. 223 / new HSA §230 — Requires DHS, within one year, to deploy intrusion detection and prevention for traffic to and from agency systems, and requires agencies to use it. DHS may contract with private entities; those firms get a liability limitation if they assist under the statute, and may not reuse traffic for other purposes. Privacy-impact assessments and a Privacy Officer review are required.
- Sec. 225 — Within one year, civilian agencies must inventory sensitive and mission-critical data, encrypt it, use a GSA single sign-on platform on authenticated public sites, and use multi-factor authentication for remote access and privileged accounts. Agency heads may certify burdensome exceptions to Congress.
- Sec. 229 — Lets the DHS Secretary issue emergency directives, and, for imminent threats and without delegation, authorize use of the intrusion-detection system if a directive would not be timely. Actions must be the least intrusive means, for the shortest practicable period, and limited to protecting agency information.
- Secs. 206–209, 226, 228 — Studies and reports only: DHS data-center compartmentalization (1 year); GAO assessment (2 years); plan for multiple simultaneous critical-infrastructure incidents (1 year); cybersecurity of the 10 highest-risk U.S. ports (180 days); unclassified systems that could reveal classified information (180 days).
- Secs. 211 and 227 — Most reporting, and the §230 detection-and-prevention authority, end 7 years after enactment. Liability protection for assistance given before termination continues.
Plain English
This title tells DHS to run a voluntary cyber-threat sharing hub and to scan and block suspicious traffic on civilian federal networks, while limiting new regulation of private companies and carving out defense and intelligence systems.
Title Summary
Title III enacts the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015. It does not appropriate funds. It requires federal agencies, led by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Defense, to code cybersecurity and other cyber-related positions, assess certification gaps, and identify work roles of critical need, with oversight by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Spending Breakdown
| Line Item | Amount | Purpose |
| No appropriations or spending authorizations in this title | — | Title III sets workforce coding, reporting, and assessment duties only; it assigns no dollar amounts |
Notable Sections
- SEC. 303 — National Cybersecurity Workforce Measurement Initiative. Agency heads must identify positions that perform cybersecurity or other cyber-related functions and assign National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) employment codes. Deadlines: OPM and NIST coding structure within 180 days of enactment; civilian coding procedures within 9 months (OPM with DHS, NIST, and the DNI); noncivilian procedures within 18 months (Secretary of Defense); baseline certification and preparedness reports 3 months after those procedures; full code assignment within 1 year after agency procedures are set. OPM must send Congress a progress report within 180 days.
- SEC. 304 — Critical-need work roles. Starting 1 year after codes are assigned, and annually through 2022, each agency must identify IT, cybersecurity, or other cyber-related roles of critical need and justify those designations to the OPM Director. OPM must issue guidance on acute and emerging skill shortages. Within 2 years, OPM, with DHS, must identify government-wide critical needs and report to the listed congressional committees.
- SEC. 305 — GAO status reports. The Comptroller General must monitor implementation of sections 303 and 304 and report to Congress within 3 years of enactment.
- No new grant or hiring program, and no funding restriction. The title creates measurement, coding, and reporting requirements rather than a funded workforce program. “Appropriate congressional committees” include Armed Services, Homeland Security, Intelligence, Commerce, and Oversight committees in both chambers.
Plain English
This title makes federal agencies count and classify their cybersecurity jobs, report skill and certification gaps, and flag the cyber roles they most need to fill—without providing any new money to hire or train those workers.
Title Summary
Title IV—Other Cyber Matters does not appropriate money. It directs studies, strategies, reports, and voluntary guidance on cybersecurity across the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of State, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and it expands federal criminal jurisdiction over certain access-device fraud.
Agencies and programs covered include DHS (mobile-device security and emergency-communications cybersecurity), NIST, the State Department’s international cyberspace policy (including the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues), HHS and health-care industry stakeholders, agency inspectors general on federal computer security, and the Justice Department via an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1029.
Spending Breakdown
No dollar amounts appear in this title. It imposes duties and deadlines, not appropriations.
| Line Item | Amount | Purpose |
| Sec. 401 — Mobile device security study | None specified | DHS, with NIST, studies federal mobile-device threats (excluding national security systems, DoD, and the intelligence community) and reports to Congress within 1 year. |
| Sec. 402 — International cyberspace policy strategy | None specified | State Department produces a public strategy within 90 days on norms, threats, deterrence tools, and resources. |
| Sec. 403 — International cyber criminals | None specified | State consults countries unlikely to extradite suspects and files an annual report to specified committees. |
| Sec. 404 — Emergency services cybersecurity | None specified | DHS sets up voluntary state reporting of cyber risks to emergency-response systems; NIST develops methods to reduce those risks. |
| Sec. 405 — Health care industry cybersecurity | None specified | HHS reports on preparedness, convenes a one-year task force, and develops voluntary consensus guidelines. |
| Sec. 406 — Federal computer security | None specified | Inspectors general of covered agencies report within 240 days on access controls and monitoring of systems that hold personally identifiable information or are national security systems. |
| Sec. 407 — Access-device fraud jurisdiction | None specified | Amends 18 U.S.C. § 1029(h) to broaden when the offense is within U.S. jurisdiction. |
Notable Sections
- Sec. 401: Requires DHS to identify gaps in its authority over federal mobile-device security and to plan faster adoption of secure mobile technology at DHS. National security systems, DoD, and the intelligence community are excluded.
- Sec. 402: Directs a review of foreign cyberspace-norm proposals from China, Russia, Brazil, and India, and of presidential deterrence tools, including Executive Order 13694. The strategy must be public, with an optional classified annex, and briefed to the foreign affairs committees.
- Sec. 403: Defines “international cyber criminal” (U.S. arrest warrant or Interpol Red Notice) and requires annual reporting of locations, diplomatic discussions, and extraditions, including names and charges of people extradited to the United States.
- Sec. 404: Creates a voluntary reporting channel for Statewide Interoperability Coordinators. States and non-federal entities are not required to report or to adopt recommended measures.
- Sec. 405: Creates a Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force that sunsets one year after it is established. Guidelines must be voluntary, consensus-based, and industry-led, and consistent with the NIST framework, HIPAA security and privacy rules, and the HITECH Act. HHS may not audit compliance, condition grants or contracts on compliance, or treat nonparticipation as creating liability.
- Sec. 406: Requires inspector general reviews of logical access controls, multi-factor authentication for privileged users, software inventories, and capabilities to detect data exfiltration on covered systems.
- Sec. 407: Replaces the prior territorial limits in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(h) so access-device fraud is covered if the device is issued, owned, managed, or controlled by a U.S. financial institution or similar entity, without the earlier “if” conditions that the amendment strikes.
Plain English
This title orders federal agencies to study and report on cyber threats to government phones, hospitals, emergency services, and U.S. interests abroad, and it makes it easier to prosecute fraud involving U.S.-issued payment cards, without providing any new funding.