Division M — INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

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Division Overview

Overview

Division M is the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. It authorizes funding and sets rules for U.S. intelligence activities across the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, the NSA, military intelligence agencies, and intelligence offices in departments such as Defense, State, Justice, Energy, Treasury, and Homeland Security. Unlike a typical spending bill, most dollar amounts are not public; they sit in a classified schedule that is shared with Congress and the President but is not disclosed in this text.

Total Spending

A single total is not discernible from the public text. Section 101 authorizes appropriations for 16 intelligence elements, but Section 102 says the amounts and personnel ceilings are those in a classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Only two amounts are stated in the open text:

  • Intelligence Community Management Account: $516,306,000 for fiscal year 2016, plus additional classified amounts. Advanced research and development funds in this account may be spent through September 30, 2017. The account is authorized 785 positions as of September 30, 2016, plus any additional positions in the classified schedule.
  • CIA Retirement and Disability Fund: $514 million for fiscal year 2016.

Together, those public figures are about $1.03 billion. They are only a small, disclosed slice of overall intelligence spending. The law also allows authorized salary and benefit accounts to rise if separate law increases federal pay or benefits.

Key Funding Areas

  • Intelligence Community Management Account: $516.3 million — the Director of National Intelligence’s community-wide management account, including advanced research and development that can be spent into fiscal year 2017.
  • CIA Retirement and Disability Fund: $514 million — payments into the CIA’s retirement and disability system.
  • Classified intelligence activities: dollar amounts not stated — covers intelligence and intelligence-related work of the ODNI, CIA, Defense Department, DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, State, Treasury, Energy, Justice, FBI, DEA, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Homeland Security.
  • Personnel ceilings: numbers not public — civilian staffing limits are in the classified schedule. The DNI may exceed an element’s ceiling by up to 3 percent if needed for important intelligence functions, with written notice to the intelligence committees at least 15 days in advance.
  • Transfers from other defense funds: no dollar cap stated — money moved from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund or the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund for intelligence activities generally requires 15 days’ prior written notice to the intelligence committees.

Notable Provisions

  • Most of the budget stays secret. The President may not publicly release the classified authorization schedule except as already required by law, as needed to carry out the budget, or as otherwise required.
  • Stronger, more frequent security reviews. Agencies must build enhanced personnel-security programs that check people with access to classified information or sensitive jobs at least twice every five years, using government records, public information, commercial data, credit reports, social media, legal records, financial information, and terrorist or criminal watch lists. Each agency’s inspector general must audit the program for effectiveness and fairness. The DNI must also plan to clear the backlog of overdue reinvestigations. Full implementation is due by the earlier of five years after enactment or elimination of that backlog.
  • Phone-record retention watch. If a phone or electronic-communications provider cuts its ordinary retention of call-detail records to less than 18 months, the DNI must notify the intelligence committees within 15 days of learning of the change, and must identify providers already at 18 months or less within 30 days of enactment.
  • Oversight changes, with one limit. The Intelligence Community Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General get clearer authority to request information and help from federal, state, and local agencies. The IC inspector general is added to the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The CIA inspector general gets final say on hiring and most personnel decisions for that office. Separately, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is barred from using its access authority to obtain information on covert actions covered by a specified national-security statute.
  • Guantanamo restrictions through December 31, 2016. Intelligence-community funds may not be used to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the United States, its territories, or possessions; to build or modify U.S. facilities to house them for Defense Department detention; or to transfer or release them to Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is named specifically in the transfer ban.
  • Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba reporting. The DNI must notify Congress if intelligence shows Russia has deployed or is about to deploy, or has transferred or intends to transfer, the Club-K container missile system. Required assessments cover Russian funding of parties and nongovernmental organizations in former Soviet states and Europe since 2006, and Russia’s use of political assassination as statecraft since 2000. Other required products cover U.S. intelligence collection on the South China Sea and East China Sea, and recurring reports on how Iran uses money made available by sanctions relief, including any use for terrorism, nuclear or missile work, human-rights abuses, or officials’ personal use.
  • Cuba diplomatic security. Within one year, key supervisory jobs at U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba must be held by U.S. citizens, with a possible one-year extension. Newly built or major-upgraded facilities that handle classified information must include a sensitive compartmented information facility, unless the Secretary of State waives that requirement for national security and justifies it to Congress.
  • Management and technology studies. Required work includes a study of duplicated intelligence analysis, a strategy with the Defense Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for reviewing national-security satellite systems (including commercial and partner capabilities, faster acquisition, and space-control needs), and a study of standards for measuring damage from cyber incidents.
  • Counterterrorism and breach reports. Recurring reports on foreign-fighter flows to and from Syria and Iraq run every 60 days for three years. Other reports cover Islamic State revenue, a broader counterterrorism strategy against the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida and related groups, the effects of the June 2015 Office of Personnel Management data breach, hiring of Cyber Corps scholarship graduates, and intelligence-community contracting with minority-owned, women-owned, small disadvantaged, veteran-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned businesses.
  • Workforce and grant changes. The National Counterintelligence Executive becomes a presidential appointee subject to Senate confirmation, effective one year after enactment. A recruiting-grant program is expanded beyond historically Black colleges and Predominantly Black Institutions to Hispanic-serving institutions and Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions. Homeland-security grant funds may be used in work with Department of Energy national laboratories. Several older reporting requirements are repealed, including reports on Chinese espionage, nuclear ambitions of non-state groups, and security vulnerabilities of national-laboratory computers.
  • No new intelligence powers by itself. The division states that authorizing money does not authorize any intelligence activity that is not already allowed by the Constitution or other U.S. law.

Who Benefits

Primary beneficiaries are the 16 intelligence elements listed in the authorization, their civilian and military workforces, and the CIA retirement system. Congressional intelligence, armed services, foreign affairs, appropriations, and related committees gain more notice and reporting. People with clearances are subject to more frequent automated reviews. Minority-serving colleges gain eligibility for an intelligence recruiting grant program, and specified small and veteran-owned businesses are the focus of a contracting report. Communities affected by the policy riders include Guantanamo detainees and the countries named in transfer limits, as well as U.S. diplomatic posts in Cuba.

Plain English Summary

This part of the bill is Congress’s yearly permission slip for the spy agencies, but it does not tell the public how much most of them get. The real budget numbers are classified. What the public text does show is about $516 million for the Director of National Intelligence’s management account and $514 million for the CIA retirement fund. The rest of the division is mostly rules and homework: tighter and more frequent security checks for cleared workers, more inspector-general access, advance notice before certain fund transfers, and a stack of reports on Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, foreign fighters, the Islamic State, satellites, cyber damage, and the big federal personnel-data breach. Through the end of 2016, it also blocks intelligence funds from being used to bring Guantanamo detainees to the United States or to send them to Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen.

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